The Car Was Built to Survive. Was It Built for Post-Crash Rescue?
William S. Lerner & Steven LaPenta on Rescueability, EV Fires, and the Missing Principle in Automotive Design
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EV fires are no longer simply a technical problem. They are a question of who is inside the vehicle, who is coming to help, what kind of car it is, and how many barriers stand between the two. WSL Consulting CEO and independent EV risk inventor William S. Lerner and Newark Fire Department Battalion Chief Steven LaPenta have witnessed the same reality from very different positions. One speaks from patents and safety consulting; the other from incident command. But both have reached the same conclusion: design has turned its back on rescue, and the cost is already being paid. The following is their conversation in full.
By Han Sang-min | han@autoelectronics.co.kr
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Based on extensive interviews
with Newark Fire Department Battalion Chief Steven LaPenta
and WSL Consulting CEO William S. Lerner,
field investigations, and a rulemaking petition submitted to NHTSA,
AEM explores what may be the last missing principle in automotive safety design: Rescueability.
Series
1. Rescueability — The Missing Principle in Automotive Design
2. The Car Was Built to Survive. Was It Built for Post-Crash Rescue?
William S. Lerner & Steven LaPenta on Rescueability, EV Fires, and the Missing Principle in Automotive Design
3. Every Two Weeks, Everything Changes
William S. Lerner on Rescueability, Information, and the Cost of Silence
4. Newark Battalion Fire Chief Petitions NHTSA to Mandate Exterior Propulsion-Type Identification for Vehicles
William S. Lerner, FRSA — WSL Consulting CEO
William S. Lerner is the CEO of WSL Consulting and an independent inventor holding more than 20 patents. He focuses on risk assessment and response strategy development for the EV, lithium-ion, and e-mobility era, and has collaborated with the FBI, DHS, fire investigation units, ARFF teams, and major transportation infrastructure agencies. He has conducted risk assessments for some of the world's largest tunnels, ports, bridges, and parking infrastructure — covering more than 120,000 parking spaces — and has been instrumental in alerting stakeholders to emerging hazards including toxic battery residue and secondary contamination. He is also co-founder of Intermodal Renewables.
Steven LaPenta — Battalion Fire Chief, City of Newark NJ Department of Public Safety
Steven LaPenta is a career fire-service leader currently serving as a Battalion Fire Chief with the Newark Department of Public Safety, Fire Division. He also serves in hazardous-materials, training, special-operations, and New Jersey UASI Fire CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive) leadership roles, and as a New Jersey State Certified Fire Instructor Level 2. His duties include responder safety, incident command support, public protection, force protection, decontamination, environmental monitoring, scene management, and training. He was part of the command response team to the major ship fire at Port Newark and has testified in high-profile investigations. He is currently working alongside William S. Lerner on the front lines of lithium-ion fire response.
The Airport Came to Me
What's the current situation for both of you? William, I understand there's something new in the works.
Lerner I am starting an aviation sector consulting role this September. I haven't made a public announcement yet. As electric aircraft, helicopters, eVTOLs, and drones have expanded rapidly, I was offered the role. I have been asked to take on one of the busiest — not by size, but by operational frequency.
Suppressing a lithium-ion fire on the ground is already difficult enough. Now I have to deal with that happening above my head. An EV helicopter can have a battery as large and as powerful as a Tesla Semi truck. The United States has declared its intention to be drone-dominant, and to be the leader in the Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) segment, so aviation as we know it is about to dramatically change. My scope covers not just the aircraft themselves, but all ground equipment inside the airport, and every vehicle operating airside, groundside, and within the Air Operational Area (AOA). When a helicopter goes down due to mechanical failure, battery issue, or unplanned atmospheric event, we call that a hard landing. If that helicopter is electric, it becomes an entirely different problem.
Previously, I conducted the first comprehensive risk assessment and recommendations for all of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's properties. Port Authority is a quasi-governmental, semi-autonomous agency which includes the world's busiest bus terminal (Port Authority Bus Terminal, in Midtown Manhattan), bridge (George Washington Bridge), and tunnel (the Lincoln Tunnel). My assessments also included the nation's busiest seaports, rail, office buildings, and five airports, including JFK, Newark International, and LaGuardia. Additionally, I had to survey multiple parking structures — above, below, and at street level — covering parking for over 120,000 vehicles. Why did I do this? To report to the executive leaders of the agency on how all things lithium-ion would affect the entire agency and the traveling public: six hundred million visitors a year, eight thousand employees, and roughly 2,300 Port Authority police officers, including ninety ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) personnel.
Battalion Chief LaPenta, I understand you've also formed a new partnership.
LaPenta William and I have put together a team. There's one additional partner — a former Special Operations veteran from Afghanistan who also served as a police officer and corrections officer, and who is now active in AI and startups. I handle field experience and training; he handles business structure and technology. I oversee 650 firefighters at the Newark Fire Department and run a training academy, with collaboration extending to federal and state agencies, including the Secret Service, Department of Defense, FBI, New Jersey State Police, and Newark International Airport. Newark is one of the most complex jurisdictions in the country. Multi-alarm structure fires, hazardous materials incidents, and the Port Newark ship fire — I came up through every rank to get here.
The Car Doesn't Say It's an EV
You've said that vehicle identification is the first problem you feel in the field. What exactly does that look like?
LaPenta When a call comes in, we try to gather as much information as possible while we're responding — we call that a size-up. The problem is that when we get a report of a vehicle fire or a motor vehicle accident, there is virtually no way to know whether the car is an EV or an internal combustion vehicle before we arrive on scene. It's a complete surprise.
Digital apps that let you photograph a license plate or check a VIN number exist, but they're not practical. They're also unsafe. Training standards say we need to be at least 30 meters from an ICE accident scene, and at least 45 meters from an EV. But at night, with a car rolled on its side, hidden behind a truck, with someone trapped inside — how do you know from 45 meters away whether it's an EV?
At a nuclear power plant or on a hazardous materials transport vehicle, exterior markings and placards immediately signal the presence of special hazards. First responders do not simply rush in when smoke is visible — those markings fundamentally change our tactical approach before we even arrive on scene. The same principle applies to rail cars and other vehicles carrying dangerous cargo.
However, modern motor vehicles, particularly electric vehicles, do not provide this critical information. There is often no reliable way for responders to identify high-voltage systems or lithium-ion battery hazards from the exterior. Currently, when we receive an alarm, dispatch provides valuable pre-arrival size-up information, including the address, business name, and any special hazards stored in the database — such as a nuclear power plant. Electric vehicles need an equivalent system. Clear identification, through standardized exterior markings, would give responders the same critical awareness. This information allows us to begin adjusting our tactics while en route, and tactics save lives.
Lerner Manufacturers are making this problem worse. The electric version of the Mercedes G-Wagen just says "G580" on the rear badge. You can't tell from the front or the sides that it is an EV. The Cadillac Escalade IQ is the same — there's virtually no external indication that it's electric. In the past, a closed-off grille was a visual cue for an EV. That no longer works. The grille has to be open now because of the battery cooling fans.
Starting January 1, 2027, China's ban on fully hidden and purely electronic car door handles takes effect. Mandated by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the regulation requires all new passenger vehicles sold in the country to feature exterior and interior door handles with mechanical, power-independent releases. Registration of non-compliant vehicles will also not be allowed. China has officially acknowledged the danger first. Manufacturers like Mercedes, who now apply electric door handles to virtually every new vehicle, will have to build separate doors for the Chinese market. The same car will have different doors in different countries. The confusion is just beginning, for new models to be introduced and those currently in production.
Korea doesn't currently have a ban on electric door handles in progress. How do you see that?
Lerner The danger is clear. China's decision to ban them will ultimately change the world. Once China has officially declared these handles unsafe, other countries will have no choice but to follow. Korea needs to be watching that closely. From the public's perspective, it will be a very interesting time when a consumer asks the salesperson: "Why does the newer Mercedes I want to buy have the old-style handles?" And owners with the banned handles who wish to trade or sell their vehicles will face an uncertain financial market for these vehicles if they are deemed "dangerous." What parent would buy such a vehicle for their family?
LaPenta I agree completely. Electric door handles can create a significant barrier for both rescue crews and trapped occupants. In vehicles equipped with electronic door release systems, the doors may fail to open if the vehicle loses electrical power — regardless of the severity of crash damage. For example, I responded to a front-end collision involving a newer internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle in which the front end was crushed back to the firewall. Despite the extensive structural damage, the driver was able to exit the vehicle normally, and all doors operated and opened as designed.
Cadillac Escalade IQ EV. This 9,100-pound (4,127 kg) EV carries a dual-stacked battery in a solid casing. Numerous air vents make it look like a gasoline vehicle. These intakes are actually functional — a fan must run to cool the battery pack in hot weather, which can drain the battery and push the pack into fault mode. In fact, the intakes on the gasoline version are smaller. This is a first for an EV, and the cues first responders used to rely on are now meaningless.
What We Found at the Dealership
You both went to a Cadillac dealership in person. What did you find when you looked at the Escalade IQ?
LaPenta It was shocking. Starting with the exterior — there's almost no difference between the EV version and the ICE version. The only distinction was a side marker near the turn signal. The grille is actually more open, not less — because of the cooling fans. In the past, a sealed grille was the visual cue for an EV. The Escalade IQ is the opposite. An open grille no longer tells you anything.
The door handles look like regular handles but they're electric. You have to press a button inside the finger well to open the door. The front trunk can only be opened via an internal switch or an exterior sensor. There's no manual release. A slide-out storage tray covers the entire battery compartment, blocking access entirely. And I'm a trained firefighter — I still couldn't figure out where the high-voltage disconnect was.
There are color 3" × 2" stickers placed inside the front trunk (frunk) area; however, the actual location markings for the 480V high-voltage and 12V systems are embossed in black text and symbols on black plastic. These low-contrast markings offer poor visibility and become largely useless to first responders if damaged or missing following a front-end collision. Additionally, automotive plastics and adhesives have significant temperature limitations. Most plastic components begin to melt between approximately 105°C and 200°C or higher, depending on the material. Polyethylene, for example, typically melts between 105°C and 135°C, while polycarbonate melts between 220°C and 250°C. Basic automotive stickers also have a minimum application temperature of around 46°F (8°C), and exposure to colder temperatures can significantly reduce adhesion and long-term durability.
Now think about a realistic scenario. This car has hit a utility pole, it's upside down, it's raining, it's nighttime. I need to cut the high-voltage power, but I don't know where it is. The doors are electric, so they won't open manually. The front trunk has no manual release. I can't start cutting because the high-voltage system may still be live. My hands are completely tied.
Lerner This is an old pattern with GM. About a decade ago, a GM battery executive asked me to rewrite the emergency response guide for the Cadillac Lyriq. I set two conditions. First, that the first responders to any lithium-ion incident involving this vehicle be monitored for 24 hours. Second, that the guide state plainly that the vehicle could reignite or release toxic gas within 24 hours. Neither was adopted. They may have been afraid of frightening the public. It may also have been reasoned that this particular model couldn't have a different response guide that more consistently protects occupants and first responders than similar vehicles that don't have one. Today, virtually all of Cadillac's EVs use the same components — the larger models simply carry a bigger battery, or, like the IQ, a dual-stacked one.
Looking back at that time, it proves how long I have been doing this. When I started, I was forward-thinking, always planning for the worst and hoping for the best, which is what dedicated safety professionals must do. Now, where are we concerning reignition? Three months. Where do we stand concerning toxic emissions monitoring? For the rest of the first responder's or occupant's life. Shocking, right? Not at all. It is based on science and logic. We don't know exactly what toxins are emitted from batteries because we don't know exactly what is in them — that does not have to be disclosed. Identical Tesla models from the same production year can have different batteries. When an EV battery burns, it burns the body of the vehicle, which has other batteries, fluids, metals, plastics, and so on. This becomes a very complicated cocktail of poisons, which play off of each other. So what I thought was right a decade ago is absolutely wrong today. There is no diagnosis, treatment, or cure for lithium-ion toxic emissions exposure, no acceptable residue levels, no established secondary contamination rates. It is like poison ivy — it can be on a surface, be wiped, and be re-activated. We are entering a very grave phase that no one anticipated and no one is prepared for, on any level. Doubt what I am saying? Go to the nearest emergency room and interview the teams, physicians, oncologists, and ask them. They have nothing to offer you. They simply treat each symptom as it arises and send you home. I hosted an event for first responders and police at a hospital. I took them to the emergency room, and they understood this in a way no textbook, video, or social media post can. They were exposed to the scenario, and their safety zone and safety net — the emergency room — could do little for them.
Another way to truly understand this is through the scientific data from firewater and rainwater after an EV event. The water used to suppress the fire mixes with the forever chemicals. Rainwater, if the vehicle is moved to an outdoor location in a compromised condition, mixes with the forever chemicals and toxins of the battery. We know this from soil collection and analysis. We are in the middle of the most powerful data being collected. Luton Airport: 1,500 vehicles destroyed, and the structure and the vehicles are contaminated. There is a five-year remediation plan, and they found that the forever chemicals leached into the ground and entered the Northern London aquifer.
The Escalade IQ weighs 9,100 pounds — approximately 4,127 kilograms. And if that vehicle is not large enough, you can get the Escalade IQ L, which adds 4.2 inches in length for a total of 228.5 inches, or 5.8 meters, or 19 feet long. One of those measurements should be relatable. The battery capacity is 205 kilowatt-hours, with output exceeding 700 horsepower. Its 0–100 km/h time matches the Porsche 718 Boxster. The battery is double-stacked, which means a failure in one cell can propagate across both stacks. When EVs first appeared in the USA, it was the 2010 Nissan Leaf. Later models were still low-power, environmentally friendly vehicles. Now we're building cars faster than Porsches and packing in the batteries to match. The bigger the battery and the more you demand of it, the greater the chance of failure. A larger battery equals larger toxic emissions.
Going back a few years, I was laser-focused on EV fire temperatures that could reach 4,000–5,000°F. I knew the gear did not withstand those temperatures. Facepieces fail at 375°F and the neck hood can only withstand 780°F. Now, what is my focus? The emissions before the fire. That is the most dangerous part of the event. How do I know? Data. Autopsies. Trapped occupants asphyxiate from the toxins in minutes.
Back to the dealership experience: I asked the salesman, "Why are there multiple air intakes at the lower part of the front bumper?" He said, "The car has a fan that cools the battery pack when it's hot outside." In that moment, a series of questions flooded my mind. If the battery dies, the fan loses power too. What about radiant heat from the pavement? What if the fan fails? What happens if you leave it in an outdoor parking lot for two weeks while you're on a business trip?
Cadillac has sold a car that requires constant cooling. If the battery dies, the electric doors, the electric trunk, the electric handles — none of it opens, even if someone is inside. And the need for constant cooling means thermal degradation can begin in the first week of ownership. This is a fundamentally different problem from the battery degradation we've understood before. Cadillac has designed, built, and sold a vehicle that is guaranteed to be out of manufacturer's specifications if you don't keep the battery charged or in a climate-controlled environment. This is shocking and dangerous to the public and to infrastructure. And remember, this is one of the most powerful SUVs, with the largest dual-battery architecture enclosed in one pack. It is a recipe for failure, and a public health crisis if it should ignite in an apartment building or office complex's garage.
Hands Tied in Front of the Fire
When design engineers are optimizing for aerodynamics, styling, crashworthiness, and cost, where does rescueability fit in that process?
LaPenta Honestly? It's an afterthought. The top priority is crashworthiness — airbags, occupant protection structures, energy-absorbing components. Then comes aerodynamics, styling, and cost. Rescueability — whether a rescue crew can actually get into the car and get someone out — doesn't really appear anywhere in that process.
The trends in modern vehicle design make it worse. Ultra-high-strength steel, boron reinforcements, hydroformed rails, cast magnesium components, integrated battery packs in EVs — these improve crash performance but make rescue extremely complex. Structures that are harder to cut, fewer access points, and entirely new hazards compared to ICE vehicles: high-voltage systems and stranded energy. Fire training materials are now teaching new tactics like "strategic displacement" instead of traditional cutting. That's an acknowledgment that rescue takes longer and is far more complicated.
Even in the academic literature on crashworthiness optimization, rescueability metrics are almost never explicitly integrated. It's all occupant kinematics, intrusion limits, and biomechanical injury criteria. Japan NCAP made limited attempts to include rescueability or door-openability scores, but these haven't become dominant in global design standards. Rescueability gets left as the burden of the public safety professionals who have to save lives when crash protection fails.
In concrete terms, reinforced structures and hidden high-voltage components force firefighters and rescue personnel into slower, more precise tactics. Time on scene increases. During that time, exposure to hazards grows: electrocution risk, thermal runaway from a damaged battery, toxic emissions, structural instability — all while the patients are still trapped inside the vehicle. The Fort Lauderdale case from May 8, 2018, illustrates this clearly. A 2014 Tesla Model S struck barriers at high speed and caught fire. Two occupants in the front seats were trapped; a third was ejected. Fort Lauderdale Fire Rescue arrived to find the vehicle fully involved. The lithium-ion battery system later reignited, forcing crews to continually modify their tactics to avoid high-voltage components. NTSB investigated, and it's documented in U.S. Fire Administration guidance.
What actually happens when you arrive at an EV accident scene? Are there other issues to explain?
LaPenta When I arrive on scene, I start with a 360-degree size-up. I need to identify the vehicle and search for victims who may have been ejected during the crash. If it's an EV, my entire tactical approach changes. With an ICE vehicle, I can suppress any fire — gasoline, diesel — I have the capability and my gear protects me. If it's a lithium-ion battery fire, the situation is completely different. I cannot approach the vehicle and begin operations safely; it changes the whole dynamic, especially when it involves fire and entrapment.
I need to cut the high-voltage power first, but I don't know where it is. The doors are electric — they can't be opened manually. If the vehicle has lost power, the doors simply won't open, even with someone trapped inside. The front trunk has no manual release. If I start cutting and contact a high-voltage component, my firefighter gets electrocuted, which often means death.
Laminated glass has become a completely new barrier. Many vehicles now use laminated glass marketed as "acoustic glass" for noise reduction, or solar glass for UV protection. Traditionally, a center punch would shatter tempered glass. Laminated glass only cracks — it doesn't break. The emergency escape tools that civilians carry in their gloveboxes no longer work. Our fire department has tools that can handle it, but it takes more time. And if a passenger tries to escape on their own, it's impossible. Imagine hammering a steel safe and expecting it to open.
A few months ago, a 22-year-old called 911 after a Tesla Model 3 accident. The recording of the emergency call is documented in the lawsuit: "I can't breathe, I'm going to die, I'm trapped." When rescue crews arrived, his remains were found in the rear seat. He had kicked the windows in the front and rear, even punched them — they didn't break. No human can break the new automotive laminated and insulated glass. A hammer can't even break it. His family is suing Tesla. In Canada and in India, rescue crews have watched passengers die inside vehicles while standing right there. Why? There was nothing they could do — if they had attempted a rescue, it would have been a death sentence for them. It has already happened twice.
Lerner I was speaking with the brilliant Dana Hull, the Bloomberg reporter, and I told her about a doctor who owns three Teslas — one for himself, one for his wife, one for his son. After watching our hour-long interview on TV, he decided to sell all three, at a loss. He said, "How did I not know this? My wife and son are driving these cars." Most people can't afford to sell a car and take a serious financial loss. Luckily, he could. If you own an EV, you need to understand the vehicle. Find the manual releases in the front and rear, and inform your family and anyone who gets into your vehicle. Tell them: if you hear hissing, popping, crackling, or see smoke, get away from the car as fast and as far as possible. Don't go back for your phone or your glasses.
I saw footage out of China. The car left the road, and within 10 seconds smoke was visible. Within 30 seconds, the passenger compartment was involved in fire. The occupant couldn't open the door. The glass wouldn't break. You can see them pulling out a body. We live in a world of "fake news" and AI manipulation, so of course we were told it was fake footage. It was not — it was a construction site with surveillance cameras. The public is bombarded with inaccurate information and has become distrustful of credible sources. We are where we are because of social media and the manipulation of scientific data. Facts are now debated and manipulated. This is a daily struggle, which is getting worse as AI becomes more believable. Why do people not use lead paint or asbestos insulation when building or renovating a home? Both materials are dangerous and banned. Frankly, I empathize with those who first discovered they were health hazards and needed to be banned. I am telling the majority of people that what they think is safe is not always safe. It is not an easy task.
Typical behavior following an EV fire. The vehicle can reignite at any time for up to three months afterward. Off-gassing can also continue, and first responders and the public often assume that if they don't see fire, they're safe. They're not.
Exposed vehicle chassis. The individual open-architecture battery pack is fully visible.
Turnout Gear Doesn't Know Lithium-Ion
PPE — personal protective equipment — is also a serious problem, you've said.
LaPenta The current U.S. standard governing firefighter protective equipment is NFPA 1970, Consolidated Edition (2025). Although the standard has evolved through decades of revisions and consolidation, it remains fundamentally focused on the hazards of structural firefighting rather than the unique thermal and chemical hazards associated with lithium-ion battery incidents.
To put it in perspective: in the 1950s through the late 1960s, a house fire gave you about 20 minutes to escape. A home filled with modern building materials and modern furnishings now reaches flashover — total combustion — in three to five minutes. The world has changed that fast. Our equipment has not kept pace. Count the number of lithium-ion batteries in each room of your home and you will be astounded — each one represents a grave risk to the fire service and the occupants of the home. Electric toothbrush, TV remote, mobile phone, cordless battery, cordless vacuum, laptop, car key fob, smoke detector, and so on.
Lithium-ion fires produce temperatures exceeding 1,800 to 3,000 degrees Celsius. The thermal limit of my SCBA facepiece is approximately 375 degrees. Beyond that, the facepiece crazes, bubbles, and loses its seal. I cannot safely approach a lithium-ion vehicle fire wearing this equipment. If it were a nuclear incident, I would wear chemical protective clothing — but that has no thermal resistance. Lithium-ion fires demand protection against both extreme heat and chemical toxicity, simultaneously. The equipment we have addresses neither adequately.
Lerner The skin is the body's largest organ. Just as a nicotine patch delivers its substance transdermally, the toxic compounds released in a lithium-ion fire penetrate turnout gear and are absorbed through the skin. The SCBA protects the lungs but not the skin. In some cases, absorption through the skin is actually more efficient than inhalation. For small metallic compounds — using cobalt as an example — once they enter the bloodstream, they never leave. You have them in your body for the rest of your life.
A 2022 pilot study by Szmytke et al. exposed firefighting gear samples to real EV battery fire combustion products and found that standard structural turnout gear provides limited to no meaningful protection against the unique chemical contaminants of lithium-ion fires. Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, formaldehyde, cobalt, lithium, and other heavy metals accumulated in the gear, even in open-air scenarios. The ongoing FPRF/NCSU InToxFire project is confirming and expanding these findings on a much larger scale. What perpetually shocks me in the USA is that we have conclusive data from outside of the country, and many of the "protective" organizations that first responders and the public rely on blatantly and purposefully play down the dangers. They take scientific data stating that toxic emissions have been lab-tested multiple times, under multiple conditions, and confirmed to penetrate first responders' gear due to breathability requirements — and turn all of that into "may" or "possibly." It is maddening, hence my global focus on data and factual information. I have a zero-tolerance policy for life-safety issues, especially when they are manipulated or diluted to please, to sell products, or to prop up fake "standards."
LaPenta Secondary contamination is also serious. Residue from the scene stays on the gloves, on the equipment, on the gear. Moving from fire to fire without decontaminating means residue accumulates. When the next shift comes on, they put on that contaminated gear, sit in that contaminated seat, eat a sandwich or cookie after touching that contaminated gear, and respond to the next call. I have already issued a general order in my department: any fire at a waste facility or recycling center requires full protective equipment, including SCBA — because we don't know what is burning.
An internal survey of 100 community residents, conducted to create a community risk reduction plan, found that 50 percent of respondents reported disposing of lithium-ion batteries in regular household trash. That figure should be interpreted with some caution — self-reported data on improper disposal is prone to social desirability bias, since most people sense that throwing batteries in the trash is unsafe or frowned upon, and even those who understand the risks often default to the trash when proper collection points are inconvenient. Still, the underlying pattern is real, and it matters: when those batteries get mixed into a recycling center or a load of household trash and ignite, the firefighter who arrives has no idea it's a lithium-ion fire. Any fire — wood, brush, anything — that has lithium-ion mixed in is now classified as a lithium-ion event. One battery changes everything. That is why I have made full protective equipment mandatory for all trash- and recycling-related fire responses in my department.
Lerner Fifty percent? My apologies for challenging that statistic, but I have never met an average citizen who took their lithium-ion batteries to a recycling center. Batteries fail for three reasons: inherent defects from the manufacturing stage, physical abuse and misuse during operation, and the natural end of their lifecycle. Every battery is eventually going to fail. When I started this work, an individual in a leadership role at the FRSI — UL's "educational" spinoff — claimed the lithium-ion battery failure rate was one in a million. I called the New York Times reporter and told them that number was wrong, since we were both interviewed for the same article. I said: go pull the batteries out of an old TV remote in your basement. Some of them are leaking. That's the reality. Who hasn't seen a lithium-ion battery that has swollen or has white residue? We all have, at some point. The remote or radio stops working, we open the back to change the battery, and there it is — a defective lithium-ion battery.
At a conference in Dublin, a first responder who has been doing this work for many years announced that he had been diagnosed with stage-four prostate cancer. He showed his body scan and said, "This is an occupational disease." Bladder cancer rates are 300 times higher than the general population. Prostate cancer has increased significantly. Skin cancer rates among firefighters have risen 58 percent in the past decade. What's the common factor? It tracks exactly with the proliferation of lithium-ion in the world.
A firefighter in the UK underwent three surgeries and ultimately had his thumb amputated. Toxic residue had penetrated the body and was destroying tissue. If you don't wash your hands and you touch your face, eat, or contact any surface, it enters the body. This isn't only about lithium-ion battery fires — every modern vehicle contains some level of lithium-ion. Even conventional ICE vehicles have lithium-ion auxiliary batteries. A typical modern vehicle contains 600 to 800 pounds of plastic, and carbon fiber too. We respond thinking it's a regular car fire, but a modern vehicle is a hazardous environment. And plug-in hybrids are the worst of both worlds — a large battery and a gasoline engine, with a potentially full gas tank.
It Burns Underwater
Can you tell us about the Port Newark ship fire?
LaPenta It was July 2023. A fire broke out at Port Newark, New Jersey, aboard a roll-on/roll-off vessel that was loading used cars. I lost two colleagues in that fire.
When we checked the manifest initially, we were told there were no EVs on board. But water made no difference. The fire didn't diminish — it spread across multiple decks even after reports from firefighters that the fire had been knocked down with no visible fire showing. Steel melts at 2,700 degrees Fahrenheit. Looking at the photos, the structural support beams had simply collapsed. It was later reported that EVs and hybrids were on board and had been burning.
From what FEMA and Homeland Security were tracking, several roll-on/roll-off vessels crossing the Pacific had sunk due to EV fires. And these vehicles continue to burn underwater.
Lerner Fire departments around the world tried submerging EVs in large dumpsters filled with water. Smoke continued to rise, the water boiled, and the vehicles caught fire underwater. I was shocked — not by the misguided attempts, but shocked that no one recalled being shown, or taught about, underwater welding, technically called exothermic cutting. Everyone wants a quick and easy fix, which does not currently exist. And even after a fire appears to be out, reignition can occur — days later, weeks later. There are documented cases of reignition months after the initial suppression.
LaPenta I experienced this personally. A Tesla struck an object on the highway. The aluminum battery tray was damaged. The occupants stated that the dashboard lit up like a Christmas tree, then the car lost power. They got out, called 911, and were walking away when the vehicle erupted in flames. After we suppressed it, there were 8,000 battery cells scattered across the highway. Eight thousand cells on the road. That incident reminded me again that there is no consistency in vehicle design. Every manufacturer, every model is different. I have no way of knowing how the next vehicle I respond to is built. And each and every one of those 8,000 cells could have ignited, shooting like hot bullets for a distance of 20 meters, or 65 feet. How does one attempt to protect themselves, their team, and the public? Our gear is not bulletproof.
e-mobility devices are also a growing problem, aren't they?
LaPenta Dramatically. People who can't afford an EV can still buy an electric scooter, a hoverboard, or an e-bike, and the lower the price, the lower the battery quality. It's especially serious in urban environments. I responded to a fire on the 18th floor of an apartment building caused by an e-bike. The owner had brought it inside because they were worried about theft, or they had detached the battery and were charging it indoors. Fires in multi-story high-rise residential buildings are increasing because of this.
Lerner Batteries fail for three reasons: inherent defects, physical abuse and misuse, and natural end of lifecycle. Every battery eventually fails.
When Does a Battery Become Dangerous?
Battery degradation — at what point does the risk become unacceptable, and who is responsible for telling the owner? I'd like to go deeper on this.
Lerner Think about it in terms of a smartphone. Apple and Samsung cite 600 to 2,000 charge cycles, but that's under ideal conditions. Leave the phone in direct sunlight, keep it on a wireless charging pad too long, drop it, get it wet, crack the screen — and the lifespan shortens dramatically. Batteries don't like abuse, and every smartphone experiences at least one of those things over its lifetime.
EV batteries are abused every day. Vibration from rough roads, summer heat, winter cold, minor collisions, fast charging, top-off charging. Bringing a battery from 80 to 100 percent is stressful for the battery. It feels natural to charge to 100 percent before a long trip, but do that repeatedly and you're accelerating degradation. I have yet to hear someone say they can't believe how much extra range they're getting from their EV — they all complain about how the vehicle isn't living up to its promises. What's the solution? Charge it more frequently.
My phone has three charging indicators: Charging, Fast Charging, and Super Fast Charging. Same battery, different current levels flowing in. Super-fast charging is another form of abuse from the battery's perspective. Tesla Supercharger data from China has already documented what excessive charging does to a battery over time.
Scraping the underside of your car on a speed bump can damage the battery. At that moment, the battery can enter failure mode, and sometimes thermal runaway follows within seconds. Batteries are designed not to fail, but the environment they live in is far too harsh for that design to hold indefinitely.
The Escalade IQ has taken this problem to a completely different level. Previously, battery degradation was roughly linear — range decreases over time, a service-center inspection flags a warning, and you respond accordingly. Most EV battery warranties run eight years, because that's when problems tend to begin.
The Escalade IQ is different. Degradation can begin in the first week of ownership. Leave it in an outdoor parking lot for two weeks and the fan could overheat, or the battery could discharge below manufacturer specifications. If a fan component fails, or the state of charge is low when a summer heat wave hits — what then? Look at the current heat waves in Europe; we are seeing record-high temperatures no one is prepared for. How do you assess the extent of battery damage inside a sealed pack you can't open? If a Tesla has 8,000 individual cells, it can take only one of those cells failing and going into thermal runaway to involve the whole battery pack. With an ICE vehicle, leaving it parked outside for weeks might mean a dead battery and a jump start. With the Escalade IQ, it's not that simple.
Who's responsible for telling the owner? The manufacturer should be, but they won't, because acknowledging the risk publicly affects sales. So someone like me ends up having this conversation: before you buy an EV, before you charge one at home, understand the risks first. If you hear hissing, popping, crackling, or see smoke, get away from the vehicle as fast and as far as you can.
New battery chemistries are also emerging that consumers have no way to evaluate on their own. Sodium-ion, solid-state, and other novel technologies are entering the market. Each chemistry presents distinct thermal, chemical, and electrical hazards. Sodium-ion batteries may behave entirely differently from lithium-ion under crash damage or during rescue. Without a way to identify this on scene, a firefighter could apply the wrong isolation procedure or tool placement, and end up in far greater danger.
Ironically, I was asked to evaluate a "safer" sodium-ion energy storage system last week that the military has used for a large infrastructure project requiring enormous amounts of power over a two-year period. What was I told by the company? That sodium-ion does not catch fire or produce heat. That is absolutely a scientific lie. Both sodium-ion and lithium-ion batteries have electrolytes and can reignite at any time. That information is available globally from the Emergency Response Guidebook published by the U.S. Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and Transport Canada — Section 147, pages 224–225. Notable language from that section states the material "may burn rapidly with flare-burning effects" and "may ignite other batteries in close proximity." The bigger question was how this was deployed to the U.S. military with that kind of misrepresentation, putting everyone at risk. Do I sound tough, difficult, demanding, and laser-focused, with no room for "well, you know" caveats? Absolutely. I am hired to protect the organization, those who work at it and visit it, and ultimately I am responsible for all of it. It is a very serious role that ultimately determines everyone's future if there is an event.
The LED Visible from Five Kilometers
Regarding your patent system — if a global OEM were to run a pilot program, where would you start and how would you do it?
Lerner You start with the most basic, most cost-effective implementation. New features cannot compromise the automaker's design philosophy or be too complex. They need to integrate seamlessly into every vehicle and only be visible when needed. My goal is to make sure manufacturers don't see this as a problem. The space my implementations need is space manufacturers aren't using already.
The core component is a 3-to-5-millimeter LED — the same element used in drone anti-collision lights. These ultra-small, ultra-high-power LEDs are visible at a distance of five kilometers; the FAA requires this distance for drone anti-collision lights. They consume very little power, can have an independent backup battery that functions even if the vehicle's power systems fail entirely, and can be made transparent so they're hidden behind glass. In normal conditions, they're completely invisible.
The B-pillar is typically black, and cameras and sensors are often already mounted there. On a Tesla, the camera sits behind a clear aperture — I use that same space. The shark-fin antenna works the same way. From the manufacturer's perspective, this is just a call to their existing suppliers to add one component.
The activation logic is straightforward. Any collision detection, battery anomaly, or dashboard warning light triggers the LED. Vehicles already activate hazard lights upon collision detection; this visual indicator ties into those same signals and activates alongside them. Color and flash pattern communicate the propulsion type.
If a bystander or police officer calls in — "There's a problem with a vehicle, orange and blue lights are flashing alternately" — the dispatcher immediately knows it's an EV. That information goes to the responding fire crew before they arrive on scene. They start thinking differently about the event the moment they leave the station. The time spent identifying the vehicle after arrival is eliminated. Those few minutes can determine whether someone lives or dies.
In a tunnel or on a bridge, even if the car isn't visible, the light bounces off the walls and the signal gets through. EV fires produce 4,000 to 5,000°F of heat, not including radiant heat produced at the scene. At those temperatures, sensors, lighting, communications equipment, and cameras are all destroyed. Only a system that independently transmits information can function under those conditions.
The next phase is real-time transmission of battery capacity, charging port location, state of charge, number of occupants, and high- and low-voltage disconnect locations — to the driver's smartwatch and phone as well, and to parking infrastructure. The Incheon EV fire happened in an underground parking garage. If that vehicle had this system, the signal would have gone directly to the garage management office or first responder call center. In a fire that reached total combustion in four seconds, the difference of a few minutes could have changed the fate of 600 vehicles and the health of the returning residents.
The core of this platform is that each manufacturer can implement it in a way that suits their own vehicles. The vehicles can be different, but the information is always delivered in the same way, immediately understandable to anyone who receives it.
Ironically, yesterday I had to drive two hours to a meeting and back home, and I witnessed two crashes that I missed being involved in by a minute or two. The first happened just a few cars ahead of me. I saw a police officer's vehicle forcing everyone to move left and right so he could squeeze by. Minutes later, what did I see? A gasoline high-powered vehicle with its front end crushed up to the windshield. It must have been traveling at 70 mph. The car it hit was hundreds of feet away. The young driver was sitting on the grass fifty feet from the vehicle; the unprotected officer stood next to it. Break that down: the officer and the driver understood they were not in harm's way. It was a small, narrow parkway, and everyone drove by with their windows open. Typical. Then I saw multiple fire trucks and ambulances arriving from all directions. First responders are taught to put on their SCBA and gear because any modern vehicle event can be a hazmat scene — so those already in the area were standing right next to the vehicle, but the first responders arriving minutes later were protected?
The second event was virtually identical: a gasoline SUV, airbags deployed, front end crushed, a police officer with a flatbed truck ready to remove the vehicle — but the driver was still sitting behind the wheel. He looked confused but did not appear injured. From a life-safety perspective, I was more confused than the driver. I parked my vehicle far from the scene and observed. Did I hear a siren or see lights? No. Why was this person, in a brutal accident, left without an immediate medical evaluation? Was this a remote, under-resourced area? No — it was Greenwich, Connecticut, one of the wealthiest suburban communities in the world.
You can die from this type of event. Princess Diana did. A brain bleed — an intracranial hemorrhage — can kill you immediately or present itself as a delayed death. I thought her senseless death, caused in part by not wearing a seatbelt, would present a pivotal point for occupant safety. Sadly, it did not.
So let's swap these two events out with EVs. Could the driver get out? If it was a Cybertruck, for example, the answer is no. Why? The 12-volt battery that controls the electric door releases is in the front and would fail. This was documented in the Bloomberg video that got global — and deserved — attention. Could the police officer get into the Cybertruck? No — no power and no handles, also documented in that video. Would the driver survive if not taken out of the vehicle, if there was damage to the battery pack? No — again documented by the Bloomberg video. Is the area safe to be in or around? Absolutely not. Battery cells shoot like hot bullets for up to 20 meters, and often start this behavior when doused with cold water. We see first responders begin to suppress the flames and think we are safer — with EVs, it's the opposite. Cold water hits the cells, agitates them, and they often shoot like rockets in all directions. There is global data from first responders on this behavior. The first thing I would have changed is an immediate evacuation of the area, with the road closed. So did the officer think about the vehicle's propulsion type? He did not look, or even try to identify the vehicle. Did he ask the driver? No. Interestingly, that vehicle was gasoline, but the exact model was released last year as a high-performance EV. That assumption of propulsion type can no longer happen.
If an OEM were to run a pilot on a single model, what would the first 90 days look like? And who needs to be in the room?
Lerner The first 90 days are a continuous series of demonstrations — showing it to police, firefighters, building managers, and the general public under varied conditions: at night, in direct sunlight, with the vehicle hidden behind a truck, inside a tunnel, in an underground garage. The drone anti-collision LED is visible even in bright sunlight. In semi-enclosed spaces, the light reflects off walls so the signal is readable even when the vehicle itself isn't.
Throughout that process, police, fire departments, government officials, vehicle designers, and component manufacturers are all in the same room, understanding why this is necessary and how it changes safety. Then you measure — timing everything from first notification to suppression and rescue completion, then running the same scenario with the system active and timing it again. When you show the difference that having information immediately available makes, versus no information, the value becomes clear.
The moment the first caller says "orange and blue lights are flashing," dispatch knows it's an EV and the fire crew responds on an EV protocol. What used to be discovered on arrival is now known before departure. EV fire suppression is completely different from ICE fire suppression. With an ICE vehicle, you put water on the engine bay. With an EV, water may need to go under the vehicle. With a car like a Lucid, where the battery is inside the cabin, you cool from within the cabin. Some Teslas actually drop all 8,000 cells to the ground, representing a third tactical approach. The directions of attack are fundamentally different based on the specific vehicle's architecture and battery pack. Knowing that on the way there, versus figuring it out after you arrive, is the difference between life and death.
OEMs, fire service, government — all three need to be in the room. With only the OEM, the conversation defaults to cost. With only the fire service, implementation doesn't happen. Without government involvement, there's no mandate. Korea is structured in a way that allows these three stakeholders to move closer together in a unified way. I would even be willing to provide support at no cost for an initial period if a pilot were run in Korea. Start with a single model — a Genesis GV90 electric version, for example. Once that data starts accumulating, everything changes. And understand, this is not a static situation, it is a dynamic one — it allows every first responder, citizen, and country to adapt and change as we learn more. What I am providing is information, and information can be used for generations to come, for everyone to make their own choices about how to handle the event. Korea has a unified fire service, so it's a great place to start. The U.S. does not, so we can have different suppression methods, practices, and tools being used, often at one event, if two departments show up. This disjointed system needs a constant. I have worked for a decade to provide that possibility. Departments that have the baseline knowledge of what vehicle or vehicles they must deal with are empowered to do what is best now, and to make infinite changes to tactics.
The 2027 BMW X5's electrically operated door opener — a small fin-like protrusion on the B-pillar.
There Are No Firefighters in the Design Room
You've argued that rescueability should be a formal design requirement on par with crashworthiness. What's the basis for that, and what would such a regulation need to include?
LaPenta Crashworthiness standards have reduced fatalities over decades. That's proof that regulation works. But survival after a crash doesn't depend only on initial impact protection. Timely rescue and medical intervention — the golden hour — are decisive. Trapped occupants show dramatically higher injury severity scores and mortality rates. When design obstructs rescue, it undermines the survival margin that crashworthiness worked to create.
Here are the key elements a regulation would need to include. First, standardized testing protocols: rescue time and access must be measured under simulated crash conditions — time to cut pillars and rockers with standard rescue tools, battery isolation time, door-opening force. These need to become quantifiable metrics. Second, mandatory design features: rescue-compatible markings and labels for high-voltage components and cut points, minimum access dimensions for tool insertion, and provisions for rapid energy isolation in EVs and hybrids. Third, data requirements: OEMs must continuously provide Emergency Response Guides with vehicle-specific rescue data, validated through third-party testing. Fourth, performance metrics: building on the limited precedent from Japan NCAP, quantified rescueability scores should be integrated into safety ratings, with incentives and penalties attached. Fifth, stakeholder input: collaboration between automakers, fire services operating under NFPA and IAFF standards, and researchers is essential.
Sixth, and this is the critical one: instant vehicle propulsion identification. Standardized external and internal indicators that remain readable even in severe crash conditions are required — illuminated or reflective badges, dashboard and exterior displays, QR-linked systems — that immediately communicate propulsion type (BEV, PHEV, HEV, FCEV) and battery status: charge level, damage status, residual energy, thermal runaway risk indicators. Even on a severely damaged vehicle where badging is obscured, rescuers should be able to assess hazards instantly without relying on an ERG or manual inspection.
This isn't only about lithium-ion. Sodium-ion, solid-state, and other new battery chemistries are entering the market rapidly. Each presents distinct thermal, chemical, and electrical hazards. Without standardized exterior propulsion identification, a firefighter can misidentify the powertrain on scene and begin cutting near a high-voltage system, with potentially fatal results.
Lerner The accuracy of ERGs — Emergency Response Guides — is also a problem that needs to be addressed. NHTSA and NFPA databases have many vehicle models and years missing or listed with incorrect information. The 2024 Audi A8 is listed as a plug-in hybrid, but that version was never sold in the U.S. market from 2017 to 2026. FDNY — one of the largest fire departments in the world, with 11,000 firefighters — has that incorrect information loaded into the mobile app used by field personnel. Incorrect information driving field decisions can lead to injury and death. Some models are available on the app but end at 2021, for example. So what do you do if you know the vehicle is a 2026? Is it the same? Is it different? How would you know? This is not a small issue. The 2023 BMW X5 and the 2024 BMW X5 look identical, with identical badging — so it's the same rescue, right? Absolutely not. The 2024 has a lithium-ion mild-hybrid battery next to the engine, with roughly 110 individual lithium-ion cells.
I've reached the conclusion that when an automaker designs a new platform, a rescue professional needs to be in the room. Before hiding a high-voltage disconnect cable somewhere Battalion Chief LaPenta can't reach it, bring him in and ask: is this placement acceptable? That's all it takes. It costs nothing. Rescue professionals will do it without charge.
LaPenta The same is true of the construction industry. Nobody asks a firefighter before building a 100-story high-rise. I have real-world experience — how we got someone out of a specific vehicle, where we got stuck, what worked and what didn't. That experience needs to go into the design process. Any OEM that brings rescue professionals into the design process first gets to say, "We put consumer safety first." That's worth something as a brand, not just as a matter of public safety. I can go to Hyundai or any OEM and offer input at no cost. They just need to ask.
Lerner Think about Tesla's image. There was a time when Tesla was the most innovative automotive company in the world. Now Tesla and fire are mentioned in the same sentence. Autopilot incidents have become a daily occurrence. Manufacturers need to face reality. I'm not here to attack them. There are small design changes available, small collaborations possible. Accumulated, they make a difference. And the brand that starts first is the one that earns back trust. We can no longer be complacent, or think we are not in a crisis, on a global scale.
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IIHS and HLDI are among the top crash-testing and loss-prevention organizations in the US. The Cybertruck received their highest rating, "Top Safety Pick+." But these organizations evaluate only occupant survivability during a crash — they don't assess post-crash escape or entry, and they don't factor in battery safety, fire risk, or toxic gas release. They do have data showing the handles won't open after a crash, but the Cybertruck has no handles at all — the battery controlling the door openers sits behind the front bumper and can stop functioning after a crash.
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NHTSA's Emergency Response Guide (ERG) has remained incomplete across many models and manufacturers for years. It isn't mandatory, and it's often inaccurate. The Audi A8 L was sold in the US exclusively as a gasoline vehicle from 2017 to 2026 — never as a plug-in hybrid — yet it's incorrectly listed as one in the response guide, which can lead to delayed or improper rescue methods and put both responders and occupants at risk.
What Korea Can Do After Incheon
Finally, let's talk about Korea. How does Korea's centralized fire service compare to the fragmented U.S. system, and what can Korea realistically do?
LaPenta Korea has a National Fire Agency. Nationwide standardized command, unified training academies, and centralized resource allocation are all possible. In the United States, as of 2024, approximately 27,000 fire departments operate independently. More than 80 percent are volunteer or predominantly volunteer. Only about 18 percent are all-career or mostly-career departments, and they protect the majority of the population.
The problems this fragmented structure creates are clear. Budgets depend on local taxes and donations. Staffing levels, training quality, and equipment age vary enormously from department to department. NFPA standards are not federal law — each department can adopt or ignore them. Surveys show that 31 percent of fire departments have received no EV fire training. Volunteer firefighters hold other jobs during the day and respond from home when a call comes in; response times are significantly longer. Two-thirds of America's emergency responders are volunteers. In urban areas, the fire department or EMS may arrive first; in rural areas, law enforcement often arrives first — unprotected and unprepared, with no training for lithium-ion fires and no adequate protective equipment.
Korea's varied urban landscape adds important context. Ultra-modern high-rise districts and advanced infrastructure exist alongside centuries-old temples, palaces, hanok villages, and historic sites. The narrow alleys of historic urban cores like Bukchon, or traditional markets, severely limit apparatus access and maneuverability. An EV or e-scooter fire in one of those spaces can rapidly threaten adjacent wooden structures, cultural heritage sites, and densely packed civilians.
The physical characteristics of lithium-ion fires and new battery chemistries amplify this danger. Thermal runaway produces temperatures exceeding 1,800 to 3,000 degrees Celsius, generates intense flames that are difficult to suppress, releases toxic and flammable gases, projects cells up to 20 meters, and can reignite for days to up to three months after initial suppression. Single-story wooden hanok structures sit approximately three meters apart. EV fires would expose those structures to intense radiant heat and direct flame impingement. Flaming cells projected 20 meters create a danger radius that threatens everything within it.
Do you remember the Aricell lithium-ion battery manufacturing plant fire in Hwaseong on June 24, 2024? A fire that started in a battery storage area escalated rapidly through thermal runaway, killing 23 workers. Dense toxic smoke spread through the entire facility within minutes. What would happen if a fire of similar scale occurred in the narrow alleys of a historic district?
Lerner The Incheon fire already showed us everything that could happen. In August 2024, a fire that started in a single Mercedes EQE parked in an underground garage spread to 600 vehicles. Residents couldn't return to their homes for days, and when they did, children reported eye irritation and elderly residents showed skin abnormalities. HF — hydrofluoric acid — had deeply penetrated the building's structural materials and could not be fully removed.
As of June 2026, there is no reliable method to completely remediate HF residue from a commercial or residential structure, and there is no consistently effective medical treatment for HF exposure. No definitive diagnosis, no cure — symptoms are managed, not resolved. HF also contaminates soil and groundwater; the long-term environmental impact is real. This is why a single EV fire is not just a vehicle fire. Keep in mind that the term "HF" is shorthand for a toxic mix of known and unknown chemicals, metals, and carcinogens. It's a convenient phrase that has been adopted; perhaps if it were called "cyanide and formaldehyde and other unknown toxins and forever chemicals," it would be taken more seriously. Unfortunately, I was not part of the naming committee.
Here is what Korea can realistically implement in two to three years. First: nationwide standardized vehicle rescue protocols and mandatory equipment — centralized procurement can equip every department uniformly, and real-time ERG integration via app or vehicle telematics is achievable using existing technologies. In the U.S., variation between departments makes this impossible. Second: a national vehicle rescue database and mandatory OEM data submission, requiring rescue profiles before new model launches, integrated with centralized training updates. Third: PPE upgrades specific to lithium-ion fires, replacing equipment nationwide with gear resistant to hydrofluoric acid, heavy metals, and other thermal-runaway byproducts — the findings from the 2022 Szmytke study and the ongoing InToxFire project can be applied immediately. A centralized authority enables rapid specification, testing, procurement, and training integration, directly protecting firefighters operating in Korea's historic districts and near irreplaceable cultural heritage sites.
The U.S.'s fragmented structure makes all of this far harder. Local autonomy means NFPA guideline adoption is inconsistent. New training curricula or specialized equipment often can't be funded or implemented for lack of budget or technical expertise. Coordination depends on voluntary mechanisms like mutual aid or federal grants, with none of the enforcement capability of a centralized system like Korea's. The result is uneven preparedness, duplicated effort, and a slow national response to emerging threats like lithium-ion battery incidents.
That sounds great, right? Unfortunately, part of it is fantasy. Why? There is no gear currently available to properly protect first responders from the heat and the toxic emissions. I have asked for better, more protective gear and been told by leaders of the companies that it is not currently possible. You may sense that they are cold and uncaring; there is another vantage point. They don't know what they are designing their gear to combat. No one fully understands the toxins that need to be kept from interacting with the gear and penetrating the turnout material.
LaPenta I say this publicly: we are already losing on the ground. The equipment can't keep up, the information isn't there, and the design is working against us. A firefighter's life carries the same value as the life of the person in that vehicle. A rescue worker is someone's father, son, daughter, grandchild — exactly like the person trapped in that car. Sending them into the field without adequate protection is no different from leaving that person in an unprotected vehicle. Neither is acceptable.
And we have to talk about PTSD. When a firefighter stands there and watches a family burn inside a car and can do nothing, that firefighter carries that scene for the rest of their life. I'm afraid to think about how many more situations like that have to accumulate before change begins. People expect the fire department to arrive and fix everything. The days when we can't meet that expectation are becoming more frequent.
Lerner Korea's greatest advantage is that one decision can change the entire country. In the United States, one department can change its approach and the department next door never knows. Korea can use that advantage right now. But for that decision to go in the right direction, the process has to start with a conversation with the people on the ground. Issuing directives and walking away isn't enough. What do rescue crews need? What isn't working in the field? That has to be heard directly, and the solutions have to be built together. I don't often sound like one, but I am an optimist. We have an opportunity to change the world. It is needed, and my goal is information. Accurate information is what will allow everyone to make safer decisions now, and for generations to come.
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